We study how …rm-speci…c complementary assets and intellectual property rights a¤ect the management of knowledge workers. The main results show when a …rm will wish to sue workers that leave with innovative ideas, and the e¤ects of complementary assets on wages and on worker initiative. We argue that …rms protected weakly by complementary assets must sue leaving workers in order to obtain positive pro…ts. Moreover, …rms with more complementary assets pay higher wages and have lower turnover, but the higher pay has a detrimental e¤ect on worker initiative.
Introduction
Knowledge workers make up a signi…cant proportion of advanced economies'workforces. 1 Their expertise is important for countless organizations around the world, but still we have limited insight into how …rms manage such workers. The available evidence suggests that …rms use two main instruments to incentivize and retain knowledge workers: wage and litigation policies. For example, Fisk (2001) gives a fascinating historical account of how Du Pont, the explosives/chemistry company, used wage policy to make workers stay and aggressive litigation against workers who left to protect knowledge that was vital to the company. This paper studies the management of knowledge workers in an environment where remuneration contracts are incomplete and worker initiative stems from the possibility of leaving the employer carrying valuable ideas. Our analysis addresses two questions.
When will the …rm take legal action and sue departing knowledge workers? And how do …rm-speci…c complementary assets and property rights protection determine a …rm's wage policy vis-a-vis knowledge workers? The existing literature examines how complementary assets can prevent competitors from expropriating a …rm's intellectual property. 2 We study how such assets can be used in combination with wage and suing policies to prevent employees from leaving with valuable ideas.
The crux of the paper is twofold. First, regarding suing policy, a worker that expects the …rm to sue has weaker incentives to exert e¤ort, because the fraction of the surplus that is accrued by a leaving worker decreases. The …rm's litigation policy therefore balances the costs of having less motivated workers with the bene…ts of fewer workers departing.
We …nd that a …rm protected strongly by formal property rights may not sue departing workers. The reason is that suing would then be a "too powerful" instrument and ruin worker initiative. In contrast, we …nd that a …rm not protected by complementary assets must sue in order to achieve positive pro…ts. The intuition is that if the …rm does not have complementary assets, not suing will lead to adverse selection, where only workers with low-value ideas stay on in the …rm. Second, regarding wage policy, we argue that …rms with more complementary assets should pay higher wages but will consequently experience less worker initiative. The intuition is that a …rm with more complementary assets has a higher marginal value from workers staying on, and will therefore pay higher wages in order to keep more workers. However, such higher pay will serve as a cushion that weakens worker initiative.
In the model, …rms are exposed both to moral hazard, in that workers exert unobservable e¤ort to generate ideas, and to adverse selection, in that workers observe their ideas privately. After a worker has generated an idea, whose value is private information to the worker, the …rm o¤ers a continuation wage that the worker may accept and stay on in the …rm, or reject and start up his own business based on the idea. If the worker starts up a business, the …rm may litigate against the worker. Complementary assets inside the …rm play a role in determining how valuable the idea is to the …rm. The legal environment plays a role in determining how likely it is that the …rm will win a case against the worker.
In our benchmark analysis, the complete contract case, the use of complementary assets is contractible, and the worker can be rewarded based on the pro…t generated by the idea. We show that such complete contracts imply that the …rm-speci…c assets are always used e¢ ciently, worker e¤ort is high, and the worker never leaves the …rm.
In our main analysis we deviate from the benchmark by assuming that the use of …rm-speci…c complementary assets is noncontractible. The incomplete contracts case is realistic because of the ex-ante costs associated with writing complete contracts on contingent use of complementary assets (Williamson, 1975) and the ex-post di¢ culties in verifying the value of the idea when …rm-speci…c assets have been used (Aghion and Tirole, 1994) . Noncontractibility in the use of complementary assets implies that pro…t sharing between the worker and the …rm is not feasible, and that the …rm can only o¤er a …xed-wage contract to the worker.
We explore the incomplete-contract case in two directions. First, we investigate wage and litigation policies when the …rm cannot commit to wage and litigation policies at the time the worker is hired. We imagine a …rm that has not established a reputation for how it will act when workers leave with ideas and for how it will reward workers developing new ideas. A reputation for rewarding ideas and not suing leaving workers is di¢ cult to establish when wages are secret or workers develop valuable ideas infrequently. We also analyze the case where reputation for or commitment to wage and suing policies is feasible.
In the incomplete contracts case, pro…t sharing inside the …rm is not feasible, and a worker's only motivation to exert e¤ort stems from being able to capture a fraction of the value of the idea if leaving. We …nd that a …rm more strongly protected by complementarities pays higher wages, has less turnover, and has less motivated workers.
Stronger complementarities imply that a given idea has a higher value inside the …rm, and the …rm decreases turnover by paying more. Paying more implies less motivated workers, because the entrepreneurial option becomes less attractive relative to staying on in the …rm. The available evidence, discussed in Section 5, gives some support to these predictions.
A worker that expects the …rm to sue has weaker incentives to exert e¤ort, because the value of the entrepreneurial option decreases. The …rm's litigation policy therefore balances the costs of having less motivated workers with the bene…ts of fewer workers departing. At a casual level, this trade-o¤ accords with the personnel policy at HewlettPackard, which in addition to encouraging workers to start up their own companies had a reputation for employees being highly motivated. We …nd that a …rm strongly protected by formal property rights may not sue leaving workers, in order to induce high e¤ort. In contrast, we …nd that a …rm not protected by complementary assets must sue in order to achieve positive pro…ts, the reason being that not suing will lead to only workers with low-value ideas stay on in the …rm.
Related literature
A range of evidence supports the idea that knowledge workers leaving pose a threat to …rms. For example, Groysberg et al. (2001) …nd that equity analysts, particularly "stars", quite commonly leave and start up their own companies. Bhide (2000) …nds that 71% of entrepreneurs in a sample of fast-growing companies replicated or modi…ed an idea encountered through previous employment, which echoes earlier …ndings by Cooper (1985) and by Delaney (1993) . Oyer and Schaefer (2005) and Møen (2005) …nd evidence consistent with …rms using their wage policy to retain workers.
On litigation of employees, Stone (2002) reports that the number of court cases involving covenants not to compete and trade secrets has increased sharply in recent decades.
Similar …ndings are reported by Lowry (1988 (Glynn and Mukherjee, 2003) and were also required to pay a restitution fee. Intel and Microsoft have a reputation for being uncooperative with leavers, and the same holds for a range of Route 128 companies, as described by Saxenian (1994) .
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There are three branches of the theoretical economics literature that address issues that are related to the current paper: the management of innovation, the economics of litigation, and the industrial economics of research and development (R&D). This paper di¤ers from the existing literature in several important respects. Pakes and Nitzan (1983) consider a moral hazard problem where …rms have no formal property rights protection and workers can appropriate part of their output. Such appropriation provides workers with an incentive to provide e¤ort. While our model 3 The response of Dave Packard, one of the two founders of Hewlett-Packard, was, "Are we upset that they left us? On the contrary, Bill and I understand and respect their entrepreneurial spirit" (Packard, 1995) . 4 Gompers and Lerner (1998) discuss an interesting case of the trade-o¤s involved in deciding whether to sue leavers or not. Xerox set up a committee among whose duties was to decide upon how to prevent technology leakage from the …rm. "The committee focused on two options: (1) to begin aggressively litigating those who try to leave with new technologies, and (2) to invest in people trying to leave Xerox. Variations in employee noncompetition law across states (and particularly the weak level of protection a¤orded by the California courts) make it unclear how e¤ective a policy of aggressive litigation would be. Furthermore, such a policy might reduce Xerox's ability to recruit the best research personnel, who might not want to limit their future mobility. Based on the committee's recommendation, [Xerox] Chairman Kearns decided to pursue a corporate venture capital program." shares this feature of Pakes and Nitzan, their paper does not consider workers having private information about output, which drives turnover in our model; nor does it consider the possibility of …rms litigating against departing workers.
5 In the incomplete contract setting of Aghion and Tirole (1994) , the problem is how to allocate ownership of innovations to alleviate holdup problems between a research unit and a customer. We consider incomplete contracts between a worker (innovator) and the …rm related to access to …rm-speci…c complementary assets. Similar to Aghion and Tirole (1994) , incomplete contracts and holdup problems result in ine¢ cient use of complementary assets and prevent use of pro…t-sharing contracts between the worker and the …rm.
Hellmann (2007) and Subramanian (2005) consider the multitasking problem that ensues if a worker can engage in "private activities"on the job with the intention of creating a start-up later. In contrast to these papers, we assume that the main problem from the …rm's viewpoint is that workers leave with ideas generated through their legitimate work.
Neither of these papers discusses the …rm's incentives to litigate against workers. Gambardella and Panico (2008) consider how …rms can o¤er a menu of contracts describing job autonomy, wage, and how worker time is split between innovative and less innovative activities in order to attract talented workers. In contrast to their paper, which considers the hiring of workers with unobservable talent, we examine how a …rm should motivate workers to produce new ideas (unobservable worker e¤ort). Both models predict that the best workers leave in equilibrium.
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In Anton and Yao (1995) , a worker discovers an idea privately, and the authors study when the worker will leave the …rm in order to develop the idea (start-up) and when the worker together with the …rm will develop the idea (spin-o¤). A worker leaves if he would be in a weak bargaining position by staying and sharing the idea with the …rm. 5 The same holds for Kim and Marschke (2005) . Hvide (2009) considers a model where workers have private information about the value of their ideas but does not consider workers' decisions about how much of an e¤ort to make, or …rms'suing decisions.
6 Motta and Rønde (2003) analyze how noncompete clauses in ‡uence the worker's provision of innovative e¤ort. They show that a …rm might prefer not to include such a covenant in the employment contract, in order to commit to reward the worker. In contrast to our paper, they do not consider how the …rm's behavior might be a¤ected by the strength of property rights protection or by complementary assets. Lewis and Yao (2003) show that …rms may choose an open research arrangement (open interaction with agents outside the …rm) if this helps the …rm in attracting workers. They do not consider workers' incentives to exert e¤ort.
As in our analysis, Anton and Yao (1995) analyze a setting where weak property rights restrict the …rm's ability to compensate the worker for ideas, which may lead to startup activities. In our model, ex-post holdup problems associated with transfer pricing of …rm-speci…c complementary assets prevent credible pro…t-sharing contracts. Furthermore, Anton and Yao (1995) do not explore the role of complementary assets on the …rm's wage and litigation policies. Yao (1994, 2002) ask how a privately informed inventor might sell an idea when formal property rights are nonexistent. Anton and Yao (1994) argue that the threat of selling o¤ the idea to a competitor may give the inventor bargaining power with an incumbent …rm, and Anton and Yao (2002) argue that the innovator may partially disclose the idea and can then persuade the …rm to pay more. 7 We use the insight from Anton and Yao that an inventor may be reluctant to reveal the content of an idea to motivate our assumption that workers have private information about their innovations.
The incentives to litigate have been studied by several authors, e.g., Bebchuk (1984) and Reinganum and Wilde (1986) on pretrial negotiations, and Priest and Klein (1984) on the probability of succeeding in court. Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989) provide a review of this literature. Regarding empirical evidence, Siegelman and Waldfogel (1996) and Lanjouw and Lerner (1998) estimate a Priest-Klein model on data from litigation cases and …nd that intellectual property rights cases are relatively predictable but also quite hard to win (about 35% are ruled in favor of the plainti¤ in the former sample).
According to Mans…eld (1986) and Teece (1986) , in many industries, …rms regard complementary assets, rather than intellectual property rights, as their main tool for protecting their innovations. By refusing access to …rm-speci…c complementary assets, the …rm makes it less tempting to steal intellectual property. This paper is to our knowledge the …rst on how complementary assets a¤ect the management of knowledge workers.
Most of the industrial economics literature on R&D has considered the …rm as a unit and examined how product-market competition and patent policy determine R&D investments jointly (for a comprehensive overview, see Scotchmer, 2004 contains the noncommitment analysis, while Section 5 contains the commitment analysis.
The empirical implications of the model are discussed in Section 6. Section 7 examines the possibility of pro…t-sharing arrangements with workers and out-of-court settlements.
Section 8 concludes.
The model
The model describes the development of an idea inside the …rm by a worker and how the …rm can motivate the worker and at the same time bene…t from new ideas. There are …ve dates in the model.
Date 1:
There is one principal (…rm) and one agent (worker). The agent has no private wealth, and reservation utility U > 0. At date 1, the agent is hired and paid an initial wage F 0. 8 The worker then exerts e¤ort e at a private cost c(e), where c(e) satis…es c(0) = c 0 (0) = 0 and c 00 (e) > 0.
Date 2: The worker's e¤ort produces an idea with stand-alone value x, where x = e+ , and is a random variable with full support and distribution function G( ). 9 Throughout, we assume for simplicity that G( ) is such that the utility and pro…ts functions are concave globally. The agent learns x, whereas the …rm learns x with probability p. In the main analysis we let p = 0, so that the worker has private information about x. In Section 7.1 we discuss the case where p > 0.
8 F = 0 re ‡ects the case where the …rm pays the worker a low wage in the …rst period (although not a negative wage, which would violate limited liability), but the worker has the chance of discovering a valuable innovation. 9 We assume that ideas with negative values are also implemented. All of our results continue to hold if we assume that ideas with negative values are scrapped, or that the support of is positive (so that all ideas have positive value).
Access to …rm-speci…c complementary assets increases the idea value from x to x, where 1. Weak complementarities correspond to close to 1, and strong complementarities correspond to >> 1. Date 5: If the …rm sues, the payo¤s depend on the court outcome. Upon reaching the court, the idea has matured into something more "physical" (such as technical drawings or a prototype) that-although its value is not veri…able-the court can transfer from the worker to the …rm. The court rules in favor of either the …rm or the worker. If the court rules in favor of the …rm, the …rm gets x. The worker gets 0. In contrast, if the court rules in favor of the worker, the worker keeps the idea and develops it independently of the …rm. The …rm then gets 0, and the worker gets x. We assume that the litigation costs are zero. In Section 7.2 we analyze the implications of positive suing costs.
As evidenced by a large body of legal literature (see Merges, 1999, or Kim and Marschke, 2005, p. 299, for references) …rms and employees cannot contract easily around the problem of workers leaving with innovations, an important reason being that overly broad noncompete or "trailer" clauses will be voided by courts. We assume that enforcement by courts is probabilistic, in that the …rm wins the litigation trial with probability
A high corresponds to the case where the court enforcement is strong. The idea that court outcomes are probabilistic is common in the theoretical literature (e.g., Cooter and Rubinfeld, 1989) and has substantial empirical support, see e.g., Lemley and Shapiro (2005) . In the current context, one reason why court outcomes can be modeled most plausibly as probabilistic is that it can be di¢ cult for courts to establish whether the innovation was conceived when the leaver was still an employee (Merges, 1999) . 10 We think of as partly being determined by industry characteristics such as di¢ culty in assessing the nature of early-stage innovations, and partly by legislation and practice.
An overview of the timing appears in Figure 1 :
The worker generates an idea and learns its value.
Date 0 Date 1 Date 2 Date 5
If possible, the firm commits to wage and litigation policies.
The firm makes a wage offer and the worker accepts or rejects.
Date 3
A worker is hired and chooses a nonobservable effort level.
If the firm litigates, the court makes a decision.
Date 4
If the worker leaves, the firm decides whether to sue or not. In our main case, analyzed in Section 4, we assume that the …rm cannot commit to litigation and wage policies at date 0. For instance, it might be di¢ cult to establish a reputation for a wage policy if wage levels are di¢ cult to observe for outside workers, or it might be di¢ cult to establish a reputation for not litigating against departing workers if they leave infrequently. Alternatively, the …rm could be too young to have established a reputation. 11 To understand the role played by the noncommitment assumption, in Section 5 we analyze a setting where commitment to wage and suing policies is feasible at date 0.
The basic trade-o¤s in the main analysis are as follows. The worker chooses an e¤ort level trading o¤ its private cost against a higher value of the idea if he becomes an entrepreneur. The …rm sets a wage that trades o¤ the gains from keeping better worker types (ideas) with the cost of paying more for all staying workers. We focus on perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE). A combination of strategies is a PBE if three conditions are satis…ed: the …rm sets its wage and litigation policies optimally given its beliefs about worker behavior; the worker anticipates the …rm's behavior and chooses his e¤ort level and whether or not to leave to maximize his utility; and the …rm's conjecture about the worker's behavior is ful…lled.
The model captures in a simple way how …rm-speci…c complementary assets and the legal institutional framework a¤ect the interaction between knowledge workers and employers. Several aspects of the legal process are left out of the model. For example, our model does not take into account that the court may demand that compensation be paid by the worker to the …rm, rather than demanding that the idea be returned to the …rm. Furthermore, in our basic model, the parties have no litigation costs. This last possibility is discussed in Section 7.2.
Benchmark: complete contracts
If the idea is developed inside the …rm, …rm-speci…c complementary assets can be employed. Such assets include patents, co-workers, production equipment, and technology.
In the main analysis, we assume that using such assets increases production e¢ ciency (by the factor ) but at the same time makes it impossible to write contracts on the marginal contribution of the worker. To understand the role played by the latter assumption, we now consider the benchmark case where the use of complementary assets does not prevent the …rm from paying a wage conditional on pro…t.
The worker stays only if B(x) (1 )x. If the worker stays, the …rm's pro…ts equal ( x B). The …rm chooses a wage B(x) to maximize pro…ts. We then have the following result.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the worker can be rewarded based on the pro…t generated by the idea. Then the …rm o¤ers the worker a wage equal to the entrepreneurial option,
(1 )x. There is no turnover, and …rm pro…ts are ( + 1)x.
The optimal contract ensures that the worker stays in the …rm and uses the complementary assets to develop the idea. The worker receives no information rent additional to the outside value of the idea, and the …rm maximizes pro…t by using …rm-speci…c complementary assets e¢ ciently. The optimal allocation of payo¤s can be implemented by giving the worker a …xed share in the project outcome. The worker gets a share s of pro…ts,
The worker's continuation wage is associated positively with idea quality, and consequently there is pro…t sharing under complete contracts.
4 Incomplete contracts
Firm-speci…c assets do not have a market price, and it is di¢ cult to know in advance which assets will contribute to the development of the idea. Ex-post negotiation of specialized assets (such as licensing of patents) blurs the picture of the pro…tability of the idea and makes it di¢ cult to write contracts based on pro…tability (for a similar idea, see e.g., Aghion and Tirole, 1994) . For example, in the absence of comparable market prices, the …rm may hold up the worker and tunnel pro…t out of the unit by charging high transfer prices for inputs. 13 Hence, we assume that it is infeasible to write contracts based on pro…t if complementary assets are used and internally priced within the …rm. We also assume that the worker cannot communicate credibly the true value of the idea to the …rm, because a report would be cheap talk and cannot be veri…ed. 14 The combination of incomplete contracts and relationship-speci…c investments by …rms and workers relates our analysis closely to seminal work by Williamson (1975) and later formal models by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) . The observation made in the previous section-that complete contracts could prevent holdup problems and induce e¢ cient investments-was made previously by Crawford (1988) .
We assume that the …rm has two options at date 3: the idea can be developed in a unit with access to …rm-speci…c complementary assets, and the worker is paid a …xed wage; or, alternatively, the worker can develop the idea in a separate unit without access to complementary assets and be paid according to the pro…t of the unit (i.e., no transfer pricing and holdup problems). Proposition 2 shows that the …rm will choose the …rst alternative optimally.
Proposition 2 Suppose the …rm can o¤er the worker either a …xed wage using complementary assets or a pro…t-sharing contract not using complementary assets. The …rm will maximize pro…t by o¤ering a …xed-wage contract and letting the worker use complementary assets.
In light of the contributions of Klein et al. (1978) and Williamson (1979) it is not surprising that contracting problems in markets can lead to vertical integration and weaker incentives. In our model, it is the holdup problem associated with the noncontractibility of …rm-speci…c complementary assets that makes integration optimal (ideas are developed inside the …rm) and incentives weak.
Proposition 2 simpli…es the analysis of the incomplete contracts case by letting us focus on …xed-wage contracts. Next, we will examine this case in more detail and focus on how wages, worker turnover, and litigation policy depend on the …rm's level of …rm-speci…c complementary assets. In Section 7.1, we extend the analysis by allowing the …rm to observe the pro…tability of the new idea with some probability, and we show how this possibility leads to some pro…t sharing inside the …rm.
Equilibrium
We now solve for the equilibrium when the …rm cannot commit to litigation and wage policies at date 0. To ease the exposition, we assume uniqueness of equilibrium for a given ( ; ). Proofs appear in Appendix A.
The worker' s leaving decision: Because > 0, it will always be optimal for the …rm to sue a leaving worker. Therefore the worker's utility is B if staying with the …rm and x(1 ) if leaving. The worker leaves if x exceeds the cuto¤ z, where z = B (1 ) .
Thus the best ideas tend to leave the …rm.
The …rm' s wage o¤er: For a given e, the …rm's pro…ts equal:
The …rst term captures the …rm's gain from keeping the worker and developing the idea inside the …rm. The second term captures the expected pro…ts from suing a leaving worker. Substituting for B = (1 )z in equation (1) and di¤erentiating with respect to z, we obtain the …rm's marginal pro…ts:
The …rst term re ‡ects the increase in pro…ts from keeping higher worker types, and the second term re ‡ects the larger wage bill to worker types that stay. Setting z = 0 de…nes implicitly the optimal z, denoted by z , with the second-order condition zz < 0. Because occurs only in the …rst term of equation (2), it follows that z increases in . Because
(1-) occurs in both terms of equation (2), z is independent of . Thus the e¤ects of a changed must occur via the worker's …rst-order condition.
The worker' s e¤ort decision: For a given z, the worker's expected utility equals:
The …rst term represents the worker's utility if staying (x z), and the latter term represents the worker's utility if he leaves (x > z). Substituting for B = (1 )z in equation (3) and di¤erentiating with respect to e, we obtain the worker's marginal utility:
The …rst term represents the marginal gain from e¤ort while the second term re ‡ects the marginal cost. Because 1 G(z e ) equals the probability that the agent starts up his own company, we see that the agent's motivation to exert e¤ort stems from the possibility of becoming an entrepreneur. The optimal e¤ort level, denoted by e , is de…ned implicitly by U e = 0. It follows from equation (4) that the worker will be more motivated if property rights are weak (low ) or if he expects a low wage o¤er (i.e., a low z). Because does not occur in equation (4), worker e¤ort does not depend directly on . Thus the e¤ects of a changed must come via the …rm's …rst-order condition. Equilibrium is a combination (e ; z ) that solves equations (2) and (4) with equality.
Let us summarize the equilibrium with the following remark.
Remark 1 In equilibrium, (i) e¤ort is lower than in the complete contracts case,
(ii) turnover is positive, (iii) the best ideas leave the …rm.
To illustrate the equilibrium, consider Figure 2 , which illustrates the worker's best e¤ort response function e (z) and the …rm's best response function z (e). The worker's best response function e (z) slopes downward in (z; e) space, because a higher expected wage o¤er means that the worker becomes less motivated. The …rm's best response function z (e) slopes upward in (z; e) space, because a higher e¤ort means that it will become more attractive to keep the marginal worker type. 15 The unique equilibrium is given by the intersection of the two lines. Worker types with ideas whose value exceeds z leave the …rm.
In the following sections, we analyze how the equilibrium is a¤ected by a change in the level of complementary assets and in the strength of property rights protection.
Complementary assets
Firms often hold assets that are important for developing new ideas. Potential complementary assets include existing patents, specialized production capacity, or co-workers with knowledge important for further development of the idea. In this section, we examine how these …rm-speci…c complementary assets in ‡uence the …rm's choice of policies for retaining and motivating the worker. We de…ne turnover as the probability of the worker leaving the …rm, i.e., 1 G(z e).
Proposition 3 More …rm-speci…c complementary assets (higher ) give i) higher continuation wage, ii) lower e¤ort, and iii) lower worker turnover. When increases, the worker's best response function e (z) is una¤ected (the value of the entrepreneurial option is unchanged), whereas the …rm's best response function z (e) shifts to the right; for any level of e¤ort, it becomes more bene…cial for the …rm to keep the marginal worker. Consequently, when increases, the …rm raises its wage o¤er to keep more worker types. When the wage is raised, the entrepreneurship option becomes less attractive relative to staying on in the …rm, and worker e¤ort decreases. Both these e¤ects pull in the direction of a reduced turnover rate. Merges (1999) and Stone (2002) argue that courts' enforcement of postemployment restraints varies from state to state and even from case to case. For example, courts di¤er in their interpretation of whether negative knowledge quali…es as a trade secret (Stone, 2002, p. 756) or more generally in their emphasis of the protection of …rms'R&D investments versus the protection of free worker mobility and the right to start up a new company.
Intellectual property rights
Alternatively, legal scholars argue that Massachusetts courts are more "pro-…rm" while the California courts are "pro-employee" when they interpret noncompete clauses and other features of contract law (see Merges, 1999, and Hellmann, 2007) . In this section, we examine how the strength of intellectual property rights, as captured by , in ‡uences the …rm's choice of policies for retaining and motivating workers. When increases, the worker has weaker incentives to exert e¤ort, because the entrepreneurial payo¤ is smaller. Hence e (z) shifts downward. An increased makes it cheaper for the …rm to keep the marginal worker, because the entrepreneurial option has become less attractive. At the same time, the worker's departure becomes less costly to the …rm. These two e¤ects cancel in equilibrium, and the z (e) function stays …xed. Because B = z(1 ), an increase in leads to a lower wage. There are two e¤ects on the turnover rate 1 G(z e). First, z decreases, which in isolation leads to higher turnover. On the other hand, stronger intellectual property rights decrease e¤ort, which (for a given z)
leads to a lower turnover rate. In the proof of Proposition 4, we show that the second e¤ect dominates.
Regarding welfare, we argue based on Proposition 4 that e¢ cient intellectual property rights should balance the bene…cial ex-ante e¤ects from motivating workers against the negative ex-post e¤ects on the use of complementary assets. Two features of the e¢ cient can be noted. First, = 1 can never be strictly optimal. The reason is that if = 1 and the …rm sues, no worker types will leave, and e¤ort will be zero. When = 1, the marginal gain in e¤ort from decreasing is therefore large while the marginal turnover cost is small. Second, = 0 cannot be optimal if is close to 1. The intuition is that if = 0 and is close to 1, the …rm's pro…ts must be negative, and the worker would not be employed in the …rst place. The welfare trade-o¤ we identify stands in contrast with the view put forward by Merges (1999) , who argues that strong employer protection should be implemented to encourage both the …rm's R&D investments and e¢ cient expost use of innovations. The di¤erence between our analysis and that of Merges (1999) is that we focus on the harmful ex-ante e¤ects on employee motivation from stronger (…rm) property rights protection. We also note that existing R&D policy literature (see Scotchmer, 2004) typically argues that intellectual property rights should be strong when ex-ante e¤ects (on …rms'R&D investments) are important relative to ex-post e¤ects (on the use of innovations). Our analysis complements this literature by suggesting that intellectual property rights should be weak when the ex-ante e¤ects (on worker initiative) are relatively important and strong when the ex-post e¤ects (on the use of complementary assets) are important.
Commitment
In this section, we assume that the …rm can commit to wage and suing policies at date 0. 
Equilibrium and the suing decision
We now solve for the equilibrium when the …rm can commit to litigation and wage policies at date 0. Proofs appear in Appendix B.
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The worker' s leaving decision: After x has been learned by the worker and the …rm has o¤ered continuation wage B, the worker's utility is B if staying, x if leaving and not being sued by the …rm, and x(1 ) if leaving and being sued by the …rm. Because the payo¤ from leaving increases in x (independently of whether the …rm sues or not), the worker leaves if x is su¢ ciently high. A worker who expects not to be sued leaves if the value of the idea, x, is higher than B. On the other hand, a worker who expects to be sued leaves only if the value of the idea exceeds B=(1 ). Thus, independently of the litigation decision, the best ideas tend to leave the …rm.
The worker' s e¤ort decision: Let I be an indicator function that equals 1 if the …rm sues and 0 if not. For given wage and suing policies, the worker's expected utility is:
The …rst term represents the worker's utility if staying (x z), and the latter term represents the worker's utility if he leaves (x > z). It is the same expression as in the noncommitment case, equation (3), except that the suing decision by the …rm is accommodated by the indicator function I. Recall that z = B=(1 I ). Substituting for B in equation (5) and di¤erentiating with respect to z, we obtain:
The …rst term represents the marginal gain from e¤ort, while the second term re ‡ects the marginal cost. Because 1 G(z e) equals the probability that the worker leaves, we see that the agent's motivation to exert e¤ort, as under noncommitment, stems from the possibility of becoming an entrepreneur. The optimal e¤ort level, denoted by e , is de…ned implicitly by U e = 0. As under noncommitment, it follows from equation (6) that the worker will be more motivated if property rights are weak, or if he expects a low wage o¤er (i.e., e z < 0). It follows directly from equation (6) is the worker's best response function if the …rm sues and e N S (z) is the worker's best response function if the …rm does not sue. Under both suing regimes, a higher wage leads to a lower worker e¤ort; both e S (z) and e N S (z) are downward sloping. For a given wage, worker e¤ort is lower if the …rm sues; e S (z) lies to the south of e N S (z). The …rm's problem in the commitment case is to pick the point on e S (z) and e N S (z) that maximizes pro…ts.
The …rm' s wage o¤er: The …rm's pro…t equals:
The …rst term captures the …rm's gain from keeping the worker and developing ideas inside the …rm. The second term captures the expected bene…t from suing leaving worker types. The …rm's pro…t, equation (7), is the same expression as in the noncommitment case, equation (1), except that e is now a function of z and the …rm's suing decision is taken into account by the indicator function I. For the reduced form, we can write pro…ts as a function (z; e(z)). The …rm's marginal pro…ts become:
The …rst term is the direct e¤ect of increasing z, which is the same as in the noncommitment case, and the second term accommodates the fact that changing z will reduce worker e¤ort. At the optimum, the …rm sets d dz = 0 for either I = 0 or I = 1.
The second term of equation (8) is negative, and it follows from comparing equation (8) and equation (2) that the …rm o¤ers a lower wage in the commitment case than in the noncommitment case (conditional on the suing decision being the same in the two cases).
The intuition is that increasing the wage has, relative to the noncommitment analysis, the additional e¤ect of decreasing e¤ort as depicted in Figure 5 .
Recall that in the noncommitment analysis, it is always optimal for the …rm to sue a leaving worker: there are no suing costs, and the …rm may win in court. As illustrated in Figure 5 , the commitment case gives the …rm a genuine trade-o¤: the suing decision balances the positive e¤ect of e¤ort against the negative e¤ect of letting more worker types leave.
Proposition 5 A …rm protected strongly by intellectual property rights ( high) may not sue a leaving worker.
A …rm protected strongly by intellectual property rights may increase pro…ts by relinquishing its intellectual property rights and committing not to sue a leaving worker. The key to understanding this result is that a nonlitigation policy improves the worker's outside options and increases e¤ort. Depending on the level of complementary assets inside the …rm, the gain from increased e¤ort may exceed the negative e¤ect on pro…ts from not litigating a leaving worker. Given this argument, one interpretation of Hewlett-Packard's personnel policy is that it was well protected by property rights and complementary assets-so well that litigating against leaving workers would seriously damage worker initiative.
We can also provide a condition under which it will be optimal for the …rm to sue.
Proposition 6 A …rm not protected by complementary assets ( 1) must sue a leaving worker to obtain positive pro…ts.
If a …rm not protected by complementary assets does not sue, only worker types with
x < B will stay on in the …rm. This adverse selection problem leads to negative pro…ts;
hence the only way for such a …rm to obtain positive pro…ts is to sue a leaving worker.
Comparative statics
Let us now discuss the comparative statics results under commitment, and compare them with the comparative statics results of the noncommitment case. Proposition 3 states that a …rm holding more complementary assets will o¤er a higher wage, the worker exerts less e¤ort, and turnover is lower. The same result holds under commitment if c(e) is su¢ ciently convex.
Proposition 7 Independently of the …rm's commitment power, having more complementary assets makes each worker idea more valuable, which makes it pro…table to o¤er a higher wage and reduce worker turnover. However, in the commitment case there is the additional, opposite, e¤ect: the …rm can lower its wage o¤er in order to increase the value of the entrepreneurial option and thereby increase e¤ort. The more complementary assets, the more important it is for the …rm to stimulate e¤ort, which strengthens the importance of this e¤ect for the …rm. Hence, in isolation this e¤ect means that having more complementary assets leads to a lower wage. In the general case, either of these e¤ects can dominate. The condition stated in Proposition 7 essentially puts a bound on this e¤ect:
if c(e) is su¢ ciently convex, then the e¤ort decision is su¢ ciently insensitive to incentives to ensure that Proposition 3 continues to hold in the commitment case.
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The comparative statics results on yield ambiguous results under commitment. For example, Proposition 4, part (ii), states that stronger intellectual property rights lead to lower e¤ort. Just as in the noncommitment case, the direct e¤ect on e¤ort from an 17 We have been unable to formulate a condition on the primitives of the model that ensures that Proposition 3 also holds in the commitment case. To ascertain that the condition in Proposition 7 is not vacuous, we have veri…ed that it holds in examples. For example, let g( ) be uniform on [ increased is negative, because the entrepreneurial option is less valuable. In the commitment case, there are two indirect e¤ects that make the total e¤ect on e¤ort ambiguous.
First, because the direct gain from litigating has increased for the …rm, it may lower its wage o¤er, let some worker types leave, and then sue them in court. This e¤ect pulls in the direction of increasing e¤ort. Second, stronger intellectual property rights make the outside option less attractive to the worker, which makes it less costly to increase the wage in order keep more ideas (if is increased, it becomes cheaper to push the threshold z upward by increasing B, because z = B=(1 I )). This e¤ect pulls in the direction of lowering e¤ort. Thus, stronger intellectual property rights generate a negative direct e¤ect on e¤ort and indirect e¤ects-via the …rm's wage setting-that go in di¤erent directions, and the net e¤ect could be either positive or negative.
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Empirical implications
Until recently, detailed evidence on the transition from employee to entrepreneur has been con…ned to convenient samples and case-level evidence where generalizations are hard to make (see Merges, 1999 , for a discussion of interesting cases). Two new research projects improve on this situation. First, using a data set that contains information on about 1.5 million US inventors and their employers, Trajtenberg et al. (2006) develop an algorithm to trace inventors through time and across employers. Second, Hvide (2009) uses a large data set from Norway that contains information on both the performance of entrepreneurial ventures and characteristics of the entrepreneur's previous employers.
A central prediction of our model is that the workers leaving to start up their own company will be the workers with the best ideas. This prediction …nds support both in Trajtenberg (2006) and in Hvide (2009) . Trajtenberg (2006) …nds that inventors with patents that score well on dimensions that are observable ex post but hard to observe ex ante (such as the patent being useful in a larger number of …elds or receiving more citations) are more likely to move from their employer. Furthermore, Trajtenberg (2006) …nds that employees who leave the …rm produce better patents than employees who stay. 18 We have generated numerical examples where both e¤ort and turnover are nonmonotonic in . (2006) is consistent with our model, where asymmetric information about idea quality leads the workers with the most valuable ideas to leave the …rm.
Another main prediction of the model, Proposition 3, says that the wage is higher and turnover is lower with more complementary assets . The reason is that having more complementary assets increases the worker's value for the …rm, which again leads the …rm to increase the wage o¤er. With a higher wage, e¤ort is reduced, because incentives become weaker. We are not aware of empirical studies that consider this prediction directly and therefore have to resort to indirect evidence. First, in some cases, we may associate the amount of complementary assets ( ) with …rm characteristics such as size, leading larger …rms to have stronger economies of scope. 19 Proposition 3 then suggests that workers in small …rms put in greater e¤ort and create more start-up activities than do workers in large …rms. This is consistent with the empirical regularities that larger …rms have lower turnover (Oi, 1983, Even and MacPherson, 1996) and pay higher wages (e.g., Fox, 2004) . Second, we can view alternatively as a measure of productivity for a given …rm size. Consistent with Proposition 3, Groysberg et al. (2001) …nd that higherproductivity …rms in the equity analyst industry have lower turnover. Regarding wages, Van Reenen (1996) …nds that …rms that experience faster technological progress have higher wage growth. 20 Third, mergers and acquisitions, particularly in the technology 19 Economies of scope are the purported motive behind many mergers and acquisitions. Such a motive would generate a positive link between …rm size and economies of scope. The extent to which mergers do in fact create economies of scope (rather than, say, market power) is considered by a large body of literature, whose …ndings are not conclusive. For a recent contribution to this literature, see Gomes and Livdan (2004) . 20 One can also relate to industry maturity. Initially, …rms are small, wages are low, and the start-up activities are plentiful. As the industry matures, concentration increases, and there are more complementary assets inside the …rm, workers get better wage o¤ers inside the …rm but are less motivated, and fewer workers leave to start up their own businesses. This provides a simple argument for why entry rates are lower in mature industries. We are not aware of direct evidence relating to this question but sector, are motivated often by gaining economies of scope. Our prediction would be that after such mergers, wages should increase and turnover decrease. Conyon et al. (2004) …nd that wages do tend to increase following mergers. Brown and Medo¤ (1987) report a similar …nding. Taken together, these empirical …ndings do not provide conclusive evidence in favor of Proposition 3 but do at least corroborate the hypotheses derived from it.
Legal scholars argue that legislation on employee inventions varies from state to state within the US (Merges, 1999) . For example, the Massachusetts courts are more "pro-…rm" while the Californian courts are "pro-employee"(see Hellmann, 2007 , for references) when they interpret noncompete clauses and other features of contract law. Proposition 4 says that stronger intellectual property rights lead to lower e¤ort. This result has resonance in Saxenian (1994) , who argues that …rms along Route 128 in Massachusetts have fared worse than their counterparts in Silicon Valley. In addition to geographic variation, the strength of property rights may vary across time or across industries (Cohen et al., 2000) .
For example, up to the 1980s, software innovations were di¢ cult to patent in the US unless embedded in hardware such as mainframe computers or pizza ovens. Landmark court decisions in the mid-1990s improved the scope of patenting software dramatically (Cohen and Lemley, 2001) . Such variation in property rights protection across industries or time may be explored in light of Proposition 4.
Extensions
In this section, we discuss two extensions of the basic model that will allows us to analyze pro…t sharing and out-of-court settlements. For tractability reasons, we con…ne ourselves to considering these two extensions for the noncommitment case. Milgrom and Roberts (1992) report that Applied Materials Inc., a California-based producer of semiconductor equipment, o¤ered employees who developed new products a pernote that Long and Link (1983) …nd that …rms in more-concentrated markets have lower turnover.
Pro…t sharing inside the …rm
centage of the resulting revenues. The physicist who led the team that developed one particularly successful product received more than $800,000 in pay which exceeded the CEO's pay that year. This example illustrates that some …rms are able to assess the value of new ideas and accordingly o¤er compensation. We now extend the model in a simple way to examine the e¤ects of …rms being able to assess the value of new ideas.
Assume that the …rm observes with probability p the value of the idea before the continuation wage contract is o¤ered (after date 2 and before date 3 in Figure 1 ).
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Furthermore, we assume that the …rm needs the worker to explore the idea even in the case where idea quality is revealed. 22 If not, the …rm could o¤er a zero continuation wage and expropriate the idea from the worker.
If the …rm observes x, the wage o¤er will be (1 )x, and there will be no turnover, just as in the complete contracts case (Proposition 1). On the other hand, if the …rm does not observe x, the …rm's pro…ts equal:
This is the same expression as in Section 4.1, and hence the optimal z is given by the solution to equation (2). 23 For a given z, worker utility equals:
The …rst term is the wage if the …rm learns x, and the second term is the payo¤ if x is not learned by the …rm. For p = 1, equation (10) reduces to the complete contracts case (Section 3), and for p = 0, equation (10) reduces to the incomplete contracts case (Section 4). The worker's marginal utility equals:
21 Note that because the …rm has pro…t-maximizing incentives to adjust the wage o¤er to match the worker's outside opportunity, it su¢ ces that the …rm observes the idea value. Outside veri…cation is not needed. 22 As pointed out by Merges (1999) , employee innovations are often in an early stage or involve a high degree of noncodi…able know-how held by the speci…c employee alone. 23 Note that the optimal z will not be the same as in Section 4.1, because worker e¤ort is a function of p.
The …rst term is the marginal gain from e¤ort when x becomes observable, and the second term is the marginal gain from e¤ort when x does not become observable. The optimal e¤ort, e , is de…ned implicitly by setting equation (11) equal to zero. Note that it follows from equation (11) that, all else being equal, e¤ort increases in p. The following proposition shows that the e¤ects of comparative statics on (Proposition 3) and (Proposition 4) are the same as in the noncommitment case.
Proposition 8 Suppose 0 < p < 1. Then the following holds:
(i) more …rm-speci…c complementary assets (higher ) give a higher wage, lower e¤ort, and lower worker turnover, and (ii) stronger intellectual property rights (increased ) give a lower wage, lower worker e¤ort, and higher turnover.
The intuition for part (i) is that having more complementary assets does not have a direct e¤ect on e¤ort, while they give the …rm stronger incentives to keep the marginal worker in the case when x is not observed. (When x is observed, the …rm's incentives are not a¤ected.) Thus the …rm's wage o¤er increases in , and e¤ort decreases, as depicted in Figure 3 . The intuition for part (ii) is that independently of whether x is observed, the …rm's wage o¤er decreases in , and hence worker e¤ort decreases.
Regarding the e¤ects of a change in idea observability p, we have the following comparative statics result.
Proposition 9 Suppose that the …rm observes directly the quality of the idea with probability p. As p increases, (i) worker e¤ort increases, and (ii) turnover decreases.
The possibility of the idea value becoming observable to the …rm incentivizes the worker and triggers higher e¤ort and improved idea quality. Because ideas on average are better, the …rm o¤ers a higher wage also in the case where the idea quality is unobservable (as shown in Appendix C), which reduces the worker's incentives to put in e¤ort. We show that this indirect negative e¤ect on e¤ort is smaller than the direct positive e¤ect from increased p.
24 Trajtenberg (2006) …nds that inventors with patents that score well on dimensions that are hard to observe ex ante (such as the patent being useful in a larger number of …elds or receiving more citations) are more likely to leave their employer. Moreover, employers successfully preempt moves by inventors with patents on ideas that are "better" in observable ways. These …ndings are consistent with Proposition 9.
The …rm's ability to monitor the worker and assess the ideas produced may vary with …rm characteristics. Monitoring of workers can be particularly costly when the …rm is larger, more decentralized, there is more noise in the business environment, and the …rm has greater growth opportunities (Core and Guay, 2001 , Demsetz and Lehn, 1985 , Jensen and Meckling, 1992 , and Smith and Watts, 1992 . On the other hand, transparent and small …rms may be in a better position to assess the quality of new worker ideas. From this argument, one would expect e¤ort to be higher and turnover to be lower in smaller …rms.
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Out-of-court settlements
We have assumed that there are no costs associated with bringing a case to court, which implies that the …rm always sues a leaving worker in the noncommitment analysis in Section 3. Introducing legal costs for the worker does not alter the results of Sections 3 or 4, because the worker would never initiate a court case. Introducing legal costs for the …rm modi…es the noncommitment analysis of Section 3 in that the …rm will not sue the worker if the expected idea value is low relative to suing costs. Firm suing costs will not alter the comparative statics results.
Here we introduce …rm suing costs and focus on how such costs provide incentives for 24 The analysis of pro…t sharing in the case where the …rm commits to wage and suing policies is analytically complex, and we have been unable to verify whether Proposition 9 holds or not.
In the special case where the agent's outside option is constant (i.e., = 1) and the …rm sues, results from Poblete & Spulber (2009) apply. They show that if the hazard rate of g( ) is decreasing, the optimal wage contract is a call option on output. 25 The relationship between …rm size and monitoring is unclear and needs to be examined further. For instance, Friebel & Giannetti (2009) argue that small …rms scrutinize new ideas less and acquire less information about new ideas before they choose to invest. the parties to reach an out-of-court agreement through negotiations. Suppose that after observing the worker leaving, the …rm demands compensation L from the worker. If the demand is accepted by the worker, the …rm refrains from suing. If the o¤er is rejected, the worker and the …rm engage in court. We consider again the noncommitment case and let v be the …rm's costs associated with suing a leaving worker.
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The equilibrium outcome splits the value of ideas into three intervals. The …rst interval consists of worker types with the poorest ideas. These worker types accept the continuation wage o¤ered and stay inside the …rm. The second interval consists of worker types with ideas of intermediate value. These leavers do not accept paying L and are litigated against by the …rm. The third interval consists of worker types with the best ideas. These worker types pay L to the …rm and are not litigated against.
The …rm's pro…t function if the worker has left the …rm equals:
where F (:) and f (:) represent the probability and density functions, respectively, of idea value for a worker that has left the …rm. The …rst term of equation (12) represents the pro…t from out-of-court settlements, while the second term is the expected pro…t from suing worker types that reject L. The …rm chooses L in equation (12) to maximize pro…ts.
In choosing L, the …rm balances the gain from higher compensation from accepting worker types and the loss because of the lower acceptance rate.
Observe that it follows from equation (12) that more complementary assets make the …rm more inclined to set L high and meet the worker in court. Having more complementary assets implies that there are larger gains for the …rm in trying to win in court and develop the idea inside the …rm. The commitment case is more complex analytically but preserves the structure in which the equilibrium outcome splits the value of ideas into three intervals.
Our analysis suggests that larger …rms, having more complementary assets, litigate against leaving workers aggressively and are less willing to settle out of court than are smaller …rms. Lerner (2004) collected data on all litigation cases for a sample of …rms from Middlesex, Massachusetts (the borough in which the hi-tech area Route 128 is located).
Consistent with our analysis, Lerner (2004) …nds that larger …rms are more involved with litigation cases involving intellectual property rights than are small …rms.
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Conclusion
We have developed a theoretical framework to study how …rm-speci…c complementary assets and intellectual property rights a¤ect the management of knowledge workers. We have three main …ndings. First, …rms protected weakly by complementary assets must sue in order to obtain positive pro…ts. In contrast, …rms protected strongly by property rights may not sue leaving workers in order to motivate e¤ort. Second, …rms with more complementary assets pay higher wages and have lower turnover, but such higher pay has a detrimental e¤ect on worker initiative. Third, we suggest that the socially optimal intellectual property rights protection strikes the balance between the e¢ cient use of complementary assets and worker initiative.
We see three areas of application for our work. First, our …ndings on the optimal litigation policy might be useful for …rms deliberating which attitude to take vis-a -vis departing workers. Our analysis suggests a clear trade-o¤: more litigation gives the …rm a larger piece of the cake if a worker leaves, but also results in less worker initiative and hence a smaller cake. Second, our results showing that stronger complementarities imply higher wages, less turnover, and less worker initiative give a set of hypotheses to test for in personnel data on R&D-intensive …rms. These predictions are not obvious; for example, the e¢ ciency wage theory of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) predicts that higher wages should lead workers to exert more e¤ort (because of the increased cost of being …red). Third, our results on the e¤ects of property rights legislation may be of interest to policy makers who 27 Our analysis suggests that the cases observed in court are intermediate in terms of value, while the higher-value cases are settled out of court. As Lerner's data set does not contain information on out-of-court settlements, this prediction is not testable in his data. aim to understand better the e¤ects of changes in intellectual property rights legislation.
One case that comes to mind is the current discussion in Europe on the appropriate patent protection for software innovations: we suggest that strengthened protection may reduce turnover costs but may also decrease the productivity of knowledge-work because of less motivated workers. Expected pro…ts are E [x], which exceeds the pro…t given that the worker is organized as a standalone unit, i.e., E [x]. We have thereby shown that the …rm prefers to o¤er a …xed-wage contract if contracting on …rm-speci…c complementary assets is infeasible at date 3.
Proof of Remark 1: Part (i): Under complete contracts, the …rst-order condition of the worker is U e = (1 ) c 0 (e) = 0; under incomplete contracts, the …rst-order condition is (1 ) (1 G (z e)) c 0 (e) = 0. Because G (z e) > 0 and c 00 (e) > 0, equilibrium e¤ort is lower under incomplete contracts. Parts (ii) and (iii): As shown at the start of Section 4.1, worker types with x > z leave the …rm. That z is …nite follows directly from equation (2).
Proof of Proposition 3 and Proposition 4:
For the reduced form, we can suppress It follows from (16) and (17) that D = ze U ez zz U ee < 0. Now return to (15). Using (16) and (17), we can sign the expressions in equation (15) as:
That proves Proposition 3, parts (i) and (ii), and Proposition 4, parts (i) and
(ii). We now prove Proposition 3, part (iii), and Proposition 4, part (iii). Recall that T = (1 G(z e)). Therefore:
Substitute (15) into (19) using U ee = U ez c 00 (e) to obtain:
That proves Proposition 3, part (iii). Moving to the e¤ect of a changed we have:
= g(z e)( zz U e ze U e )=D = g(z e)U e ( zz + ze )=D = g(z e)U e ( 1)(1 )g(z e)=D > 0:
That proves Proposition 4, part (iii).
Appendix B. Proofs for the commitment case
In this appendix, we prove Proposition 5, Proposition 6, and Proposition 7. Proof of ] and let c(e) = 2 e 2 , where > 0. Expected utility equals:
By di¤erentiating with respect to e and solving, we have the unique interior solution: 
The …rm maximizes with respect to B, taking into account the negative impact of B on e. Di¤erentiating (24) with respect to B and solving, we have the unique interior solution: B = (1 ) 3 4 2 + 2 + 3 + + 2 + 2 2 + 2 2 ( 2 2 2 + 2 + 2) :
From the …rm's second-order condition, the denominator is negative. To ensure that B 0, we require the numerator of (25) to be negative. By substituting e from (23) and B from (25) into the pro…t function (24), we obtain: 
Observe that if = 1, suing yields pro…ts equal to zero while not suing (identical to = 0) yields pro…ts equal to: we have that:
The denominator is always negative by the second-order condition of the …rm's maximization problem. To evaluate the numerator, d
2 dzd , we can di¤erentiate (8) with respect to to obtain (we drop the * notation): 
Because de dz = (1 I ) g(z e) (1 I ) g(z e) c 00 (e) from the worker's …rst order condition (6), this expression simpli…es to:
+ [ z(1 I )g(z e) + G(z e) (1 I ) + I ] (1 I ) g(z e) (1 I ) g(z e) c 00 (e) =
(1 I ) g(z e) [ zc 00 (e) + G(z e) (1 I ) + I ] (1 I ) g(z e) c 00 (e) .
The denominator is negative by the worker's second-order condition, and therefore sgn d 12 Appendix C: Pro…t sharing
Proof of Proposition 8:
In the case where the …rm observes x, the …rm's wage o¤er equals (1 )x and there is no turnover. In the case where the …rm does not observe x, the equilibrium can be expressed in reduced form as:
z (z; e; ) = 0;
U e (e; z; ; p) = 0.
The solution to this system gives the equilibrium values of z and e. Note that, as in the noncommitment case, z (z; e; ) does not depend upon , and U e does not depend upon . Totally di¤erentiating the system (32) gives:
U ee de + U ez dz + U e d = 0.
In reduced form, this is the same system of equations as in the noncommitment case.
The proof of Proposition 8, part (i), follows from the same procedure as the proof of Proposition 3 and Proposition 4, and is omitted. Let us sketch the proof of Proposition 8, part (ii). First note that if x is not observed by the …rm, a change in will not a¤ect the …rm's wage o¤er; the only e¤ect will be to lower worker e¤ort, as in the noncommitment analysis of Section 3. If, on the other hand, x is observed, a higher implies that the …rm will lower the wage o¤er. Both the direct e¤ect and the indirect e¤ect (on the …rm's expected wage o¤er) of an increased will reduce worker e¤ort. That worker turnover decreases in follows from the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 9:
We start out by proving part (i). First note that in the case where the …rm observes x, the wage o¤er will not depend on p. In the case where the …rm does not observe x, the equilibrium e and z are given by (2) and (11). We can write the equilibrium in reduced form as:
z (z; e) = 0;
U e (e; z; p) = 0.
Totally di¤erentiate (34) to obtain:
U ee de + U ez dz + U ep dp = 0.
Solving (35), we obtain: de dp = U ep zz =D;
where D = ze U ez zz U ee . Let us now evaluate the partials. Di¤erentiate U e from equation (11) to obtain:
U ee = (1 p)(1 )g(z e) c 00 (e) < 0 (second-order condition for optimal e¤ort), U ez = (1 p)(1 )g(z e) < 0.
Note that U ee = U ez c 00 (e). The partials for the …rm when it does not observe x are given by (17), i.e., zz < 0 (by the …rm's second-order condition),
ze = zz + ( 1)(1 )g(z e) > 0:
Hence D < 0 and de dp > 0.
We now prove part (ii) for turnover. When x is observed the turnover is zero, and when x is not observed the turnover is 1 G(z e). Hence expected turnover equals:
Di¤erentiating with respect to p we obtain: dT dp = (1 G(z e)) + (1 p)( de dp dz dp ):
The …rst term is negative. To evaluate the second term, we need to evaluate de dp dz dp .
Solving (35) we …nd that dz dp = U ep ze =D > 0. Therefore:
de dp dz dp = U ep zz =D + U ep ze =D It follows immediately from (40) that dT dp < 0. Finally note that dz dp > 0 implies that dB dp > 0, because B = z(1 ).
